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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to determine the optimal contract for the principal and the agent 
in imperfect markets, when murabahah and ijarah are used. The financial contracting 
enforceability approach is employed to determine the contract that maximizes the 
value of the firm subject to agents’ constraints when the shock is low and high, and 
regarding market frictions. Furthermore, this approach allows us to assess the level of 
market frictions that agents may bear in case of low shock and high shocks. Findings 
reveal that the simulated values of the market frictions’ parameters for both contracts 
increase when moving from the low shock to the high shock. Such evidence implies 
that the agent is more likely to cheat and hide significant information about the project 
when the shock is high. As a response to this higher risk, the simulated values of the 
profit margin parameters for the principal rise also when the shock is high in order 
to compensate for the increase of market frictions and mitigate conflicts of interest. 
By comparing both contracts based on the simulated optimal values of the firm, it is 
noticeable that the gap between both contracts is very tight, which can be attributed 
to their common debt-based financial arrangements. However, the results show that 
ijarah allows the principal and the agent to generate the highest value in case of low 
shock and high shock, comparing to murabahah. Therefore, ijarah seems to be more 
attractive for the principal and the agent than murabahah.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper puts stress on conflicts of interest among agents when murabahah and 
ijarah financings are used. Indeed, IFSB1 announced that murabahah is the most used 
contract by Islamic financial institutions instead of ijarah and other debt-contracts. 
However, there is no theoretical or empirical proof to explain the reasons behind 
the excessive use of murabahah in Islamic finance from the financial perspective. 
Indeed, the financial contracting literature focused on profit-and loss sharing 
contracts because they entail more moral hazard and information asymmetry 
problem comparing to debt financings. Nevertheless, the practice showed that 
market frictions might also occur in case of debt contracts, due to the misuse of the 
asset (Ebrahim and Sheikh, 2016). In lack of insights in the literature, this paper 
aims to determine the optimal contract that maximizes the value of the firm and 
handle conflicts of interests2 between the principal and the agent when market 
frictions occur.
To do so, this paper opts for the financial contracting enforceability approach 
based on the study of Cooley et al (2004) and Monte-Carlo simulation to assess 
the optimal contract for the principal and the agent between murabahah and ijarah. 
This approach aims to determine the optimal contract that maximizes the value 
of the firm subject to the enforcement constraint for the agent (the entrepreneur) 
and participation constraint for the principal (the financier) when the industrial 
shock is low and high, and regarding market frictions. Based on the studies of 
(Tauchen, 1986; Adda and Cooper, 2002) the low and high shocks follow a first- 
order Markov process, which implies that the value of the high shock depends on 
the low shock value. Similarly, the financial contracting enforceability approach 
allows us to assess the level of market frictions that agents can bear in the case of 
low shock and high shock for murabahah and ijarah financings.
In sum, the financial contracting enforceability approach enables us to 
determine the optimal contract that aligns agents’ interests. In addition, it allows 
us to assess the level of market frictions that the principal and the agent may bear 
when the shock is low and high for murabahah and ijarah financings. To achieve this 
purpose, section two discusses the most relevant studies in the conventional and 
Islamic literature. Section three highlights the methodology adopted, the different 
equations and models linked to each contract and the assumptions. Section four 
considers the parameters calibration. Section five presents the simulation results. 
Finally, section six concludes.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Financial Contracting Theory from The Conventional Perspective
Contractual arrangements have been widely treated in the conventional literature. 
Starting from Smith (1776) some incentive issues linked to sharecropping contracts 
have been determined, which are profit-and loss sharing, monitoring process and 
1. See Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), (2018), Financing by Type of Shari’ah Compliant 
Contract, https://www.ifsb.org/psifi_02.php
2. See Hart and Moore (1992); Aghion et al., (1992) Hart (2017) for the examination of conflicts of 
interest in the incomplete contract theory
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 1, February 2019 119
adverse selection in human cooperation. To mitigate these issues, Coase (1973) 
highlighted a new theory to assess the performance of the firm by putting stress 
on the role of technology and return to scale, as important determinants of the 
size of the firm and the optimal production. Nevertheless, the author considered 
the firm as a black box and completely ignored incentive problems within it 
(Hart, 1995). This theory was later extended by Williamson (1979) and Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and became known as the economics of organization. The 
authors established the agency theory that considers the effect of the manager 
and the selfish behavior of agents to assess the contractual relationship when 
moral hazard and asymmetric information occur. However, the agency approach 
falls foul of the same criticism because it did not say much about the internal 
organization of the firm (Hart,1995). An alternative approach to address the issues 
in incomplete contract proposed that the cornerstone of the incomplete contract 
theory is the allocation of decision rights3, which later was extended to include 
the roles of bargaining power in order to align the interests of agents. Hart and 
Moore (1994) showed that careful allocation of decision rights could substitute the 
contractually specified rewards. Accordingly, this approach has been developed 
based on important conditions: (i) the principal is risk-neutral; (ii) there is only one 
principal and one agent; and (iii) the agents have symmetric information ex-ante. 
The assumption that agents do not face asymmetric information4 problem ex-ante 
is a rather strong assumption to make. Consequently, it is difficult to admit the 
first and third conditions in our study as in real practice financiers cannot be risk-
neutral. In addition, information asymmetry5 represents the main determinant 
of any investment decision. In sum, we argue that financial contracting theory 
and incomplete contract approach have brought relevant solutions for decisions 
and rights control, with further insights and procedures must be implemented 
regarding conflicts of interest between agents.
2.2. Financial Contracting Theory from The Islamic Perspective
2.2.1. Islamic Equity-Based Contracts 
The financial contracting theory has also been explored from the Islamic perspective, 
with particular focus given to the notion of profit-and loss sharing (PLS), alongside 
the moral hazard and asymmetric information problems. However, the literature 
was divided into two mainstreams where the first justifies the marginalization of 
PLS-based contracts, whereas the second encourages their adoption.
Among those who justified the marginalization of PLS contracts, Dar and 
Presley (2000), Farooq (2007), and Ebrahim and Sheikh (2016) assumed that an 
imbalance between management and control rights is attributed as a major cause 
of lack of PLS in the practice of Islamic finance. Given this imbalance, the agency 
3. See Hart (1989), Hart (2003), Hart (2017) for the examination of allocation of decision rights in the 
incomplete contract theory
4. See Ross (1973); Arrow (1971); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Akerlof (1970) and Tirole, (1999) for a 
theoretical understanding of moral hazard and information asymmetry in contractual arrangements. 
5. See Chichti and Mansour (2010-a, 2010-b, 2012) and Mansour (2014) for a theoretical background on 
information asymmetry.
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problem becomes severer, which renders the PLS principle less attractive vis-à- 
vis other modes of financing, which is in line with the studies of (Muhammad, 
2014; Lone and Quadir, 2017). To this extent, Al-Suwailem (1998) proposed 
venture capital as a potential model of musharakah. However, the author did not 
provide relevant evidence about the relationship between venture capital model 
and the Islamic model of partnership regarding moral hazard and asymmetric 
information problem. The recent study of Mehri et al. (2017) proposed a theory of 
profit-sharing ratio with information asymmetry and considered the negotiated 
profit-sharing ratio (PSR) as a screening device in their framework. Although this 
theoretical framework constitutes a new tool for the screening managers’ type, 
the authors found that adverse selection can be captured when the (PSR) accepted 
by the manager exceeds a given threshold value, which represents the maximum 
payoff to the venture capitalist.
Among those who encouraged the adoption of PLS agreement, Muda and 
Ismail, (2010) and Sapuan (2016) proposed optimal conditions to minimize the 
problem of asymmetric information, such as providing incentives for entrepreneurs 
in case of profit and the establishment of monitoring device for musharakah. In the 
same context, Ernawati (2016) analyzed the risk of PLS financing in Indonesian 
Islamic banking. The author showed that it is more secure for Islamic banks to 
allocate funds in musharakah contracts instead of mudarabah.
In line with the aforementioned studies, Nabi (2012) examined the effect of 
PLS contract on the evolution of the income inequality with capital accumulation 
process based on the study by Aghion and Bolton (1997). Nabi (2012) treated the 
problem of wealth inequality between two investors with different wealth classes. 
He found that the wealth inequality between the two classes of investors decreases 
over time, which proves that the PLS contract changes the dynamic of wealth. 
This evidence implies that the entrepreneurship allows the latter to catch-up the 
initially wealth class, which is in line with the study of Maghrebi and Mirakhor 
(2015).
Based on the agency issues related to equity-based contracts,6 Mansour et al. 
(2015-b) proposed a new equity-based instrument through a three-tier partnership 
by including a new contracting party defined as the risk moderator in order to absorb 
the underlying risk of default and adjust the annual revenue to a predetermined 
annual cost. Interestingly, the simulation results show that immunization against 
premature default through the involvement of the risk moderator to absorb any 
potential loss is indicative of an incentive factor for the project’s survival and 
business continuity. Al-Suwailem (2003) examined the optimal sharing contracts 
by comparing the PLS contract to the standard debt contract (involving riba), under 
the cases of symmetric and asymmetric information. It is found that the aggregate 
expected profits from the sharing contract exceed those of the debt contract, under 
both symmetric and asymmetric information. Moreover, for a certain range of 
the opportunity cost both the financier and the agent are better off when they get 
involved in a sharing contract instead of debt contract.
6. See Majdoub et al. (2014, 2016, 2018), Bedoui and Mansour (2015), and Mansour et al. (2015-a) for an 
examination of the theoretical foundation of equity-based contracts.
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Ahmed (2002) came up with a theoretical framework for PLS financing contracts 
based on the study by Gale and Hellwing (1985), with the aim of determining the 
incentive-compatible contracts. While banks do not mostly have the incentive to 
enforce PLS contracts, Ahmed (2002) provided several incentives to bankers and 
entrepreneurs to proceed with this financing contract. The author asserted that the 
specification of the profit share, the adverse selection analysis, the auditing rule, 
and the reward/punishment rules are fundamental to build a strong partnership 
in imperfect markets.
2.2.2. Islamic Debt-Based Contracts
As far as PLS contracts are concerned, the literature has not widely explored debt 
contracts such as murabahah and ijarah financings from the principal-agent point 
of view. A particular focus was given to shari’ah, and legal aspects. Nevertheless, 
the financial issues have been forgotten except for the examination of murabahah 
home financing7. Concerning murabahah8 financing, the studies of Ustani (2013), 
Cahyono (2011), and Shofawati (2014), among others, examined the fiqh and 
regulation from Shariah Board for murabahah financing in Indonesia. The authors 
discussed the practice of murabahah financing in Indonesia using a descriptive 
qualitative method. As a result, they found that the implementation of murabahah 
financing in Islamic Banking in Indonesia could fulfill shariah requirements with 
fatwa from National Shariah Council in Indonesia9.
Dealing with ijarah financing, the same aspects have been treated, whereas 
some studies examined ijarah from the financial point of view in the case of vehicle 
and house financings. For instance, Al-Mubarak and Badri, (2015), examined the 
ijarah contract from the shari’ah perspective with the aim to determine how a diligent 
compliance to its maqasid can help managing shari’ah and business risks. In their 
study, the authors assumed that a sincere compliance to the shari’ah’s objectives in 
financial transaction would reduce risks in the Islamic banking industry. Current 
applications of ijarah by Islamic banks in Malaysia were assessed in order to 
identify the gaps between its theoretical presumptions and actual applications. 
Similarly, the authors discussed some unresolved shari’ah issues relating to the 
implementation of ijarah thumma al- bay (AITAB) (a contract of leasing ending 
with a sale) in order to provide evidence for such dissonances. Consequently, 
the authors shed some lights on the need to undertake constructive measures by 
policy makers to resolve the governance and legal problems with regard to the 
implementation of AITAB.
The latest study by Hanif (2016) examined legal forms and economic substance 
of several Islamic contracts used by the Islamic financial industry namely, 
murabahah, ijarah, musharakah and mudarabah. Findings reveal that the legal form 
of the contracts are in line with the theory of Islamic financial system. However, 
7. See Aris et al (2012), Khan et al (2015), Hashmi and Omar (2009), and Khong et al (2018) for the 
examination of murabahah home financing.
8. See Buchori, et al. (2004) and Ascarya (2007) for the theoretical understanding for the main 
characteristics of murabahah in classical literature and practice in Indonesia. 
9. See Fatwa Dewan Syari’ah Nasional No: 04/DSN-MUI/IV/2000 on Murabahah.
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economic substance is considered similar to the conventional counter parts. In 
the same context, Abdullah (2016) examined three Islamic contracts approved by 
US authorities namely, musharakah, murabahah and ijarah in order to determine 
whether they are acting in the public interest. The author adopted qualitative 
document and content analysis, supported by quantitative numerical analysis, 
in reviewing legal interpretive letters from the US Office of the Comptroller of 
Currency and National Administrator of Banks (OCC) and the US Department 
of Revenue. Although the Americans adopted economic substance over legal 
form, Abdullah (2016) applied the Islamic normative theory of profit to test their 
conclusions. Consequently, it is found that in assessing economic substance over 
legal form, each of the three contracts involved risk-free transaction and interest.
Chhapra et al, (2018) analyzed consumers’ preference and awareness when 
conventional and Islamic ijarah auto financing are used in Pakistan. Findings 
indicated that convenience is the main determinant for preference of Ijarah over 
the lease contract. In addition, all other factors besides religion namely, consumer’s 
awareness and income have a positive impact on consumers’ preference. Thereby, 
the authors indicated that in Pakistan, religion is not the only fact motivates 
individuals to consider ijarah financing.
In the same context, the recent study by Wahla et al., (2018) measured 
customers’ perception of car ijarah financing services provided by the Islamic 
banks and financial institutions in Pakistan. The authors adopted two research 
methodologies namely Kruskal–Wallis and Mann–Whitney test (non-parametric) 
and logit regression model (parametric). Both methods were applied to a real data 
set of 300 respondents from various cities of Pakistan in the car ijarah financing 
industry. The demographic effects were also considered to determine the 
perception about the degree of shari’ah compliance and the quality of service of 
transaction offered by banks. It is found that the customers who used the car ijarah 
facility from Islamic banks have positive attitude toward this sort of transaction. In 
addition, gender, income, and marital status affect the perception about the quality 
of shari’ah compliance. Moreover, the quality of service of transaction issues is very 
important to selected clients in the industry.
Based on the existing studies in the field, too much emphasis on shari’ah 
and legal issues was noticed, whereas the principal-agent relationship has been 
forgotten. In this regards, further insights are needed with the aim to provide 
explanations regarding the principal-agent problem in the case of ijarah financing.
2.3. Gaps in The Literature
The conventional literature in contractual arrangement came out with relevant 
insights regarding the principal-agent problem. Nevertheless, it is shown that the 
hypothesis related to the principal’s risk neutrality and the symmetric information 
ex-ante are hard to be satisfied due to the existence of market frictions in financial 
contracting. Therefore, an alternative approach is needed with the aim to consider 
the interests of the principal and the agent for seeking the optimal contract 
in imperfect market. In the same context, the Islamic studies in contractual 
arrangement have shown too much emphasis on legal and shari’ah aspects of 
Journal of Islamic Monetary Economics and Finance, Vol. 5, Number 1, February 2019 123
the financial contracting in the case of debt financing, and they have not given 
consistent evidence about the principal-agent relationship in imperfect market.
In lack of insights regarding Islamic debt-financings this paper highlights the 
financial contracting enforceability approach in order to determine the optimal 
contract that maximizes the value of the firm in the first hand and aligns agents’ 
interests in the second hand, when murabahah and ijarah financings are used. In the 
same context, this approach enables us to assess the level of market frictions that 
agents may bear if they want to maximize their profit when the industrial shock is 
low and high. Specifically, with the excessive use of murabahah instead of ijarah, the 
literature has not provided relevant empirical or theoretical evidence to explain this 
feature. Accordingly, this paper considers the financial contracting enforceability 
approach and Monte-Carlo simulation with the aim to yield additional proof 
regarding the selection of the most attractive contract for the principal and the 
agents among murabahah and ijarah.
III. MODEL DESIGN
3.1. Understanding the Financial Contracting Enforceability Approach and Its 
Application in Contractual Arrangement 
Financial contracting enforceability is defined as the ability of each part to repudiate 
the contract for a given reason10. It has been employed in several contexts, such 
as the examination of the risk of repudiation in case of limited liability11 and the 
relationship between debt-constrained and asset markets12. Other areas were 
explored such as contractual imperfections for international differences in the 
organization of production13, and the treatment of the optimal lending contracts 
with imperfect enforceability14. In contractual arrangement, Cooley et al., (2004) 
examined a general equilibrium model in which agents and principals enter 
into a long-term contractual relationship, subject to enforceability constraints. 
Theoretically, their method is closely linked to the partial equilibrium model of 
Marcet & Marimon (1992) with two relevant differences.
First, Cooley et al., (2004) run the analysis in a general equilibrium framework. 
Second, they do not assume that repudiation leads to market exclusion. Once 
the contract has been signed, the firm has the ability to start a new investment 
project by accepting a new contractual relationship, while the repudiation value is 
endogenous and depends on all the general equilibrium conditions.
If defaulting entrepreneurs are not excluded from the market, firms can start a 
new project by entering into a new contractual relationship, while the higher value 
10.  See Cooley et al., (2004) for the theoretical understanding of the financial contracting enforceability 
approach and its application in contractual arrangement.
11. See Atkeson (1991) for the examination of the risk of repudiation in case of limited liability. 
12. See Kehoe and Levine (1993) for the examination of the relationship between debt-constrained and 
asset markets. 
13. See Quintin (2003) for the application of the financial contracting enforceability approach in 
contractual imperfections for international differences in the organization of production. 
14. See Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) for the application of the financial contracting 
enforceability approach to determine the optimal lending contracts with imperfect enforceability.
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of the new project makes the repudiation option more attractive. However, to 
prevent repudiation, the value of the contract for the entrepreneur must increase. 
In other words, Cooley et al., (2004) assumed that when this value is increased, the 
tightness of the enforcement constraint is relaxed and more capital is given to the 
firm. Although the aforementioned studies considered the financial contracting 
enforceability approach for different purposes, they all considered market frictions 
as the cornerstone of the optimal financing contract determination, comparing to 
the hypothesis linked to the incomplete contract theory that we have discussed 
previously.
Drawn upon the study of Cooley et al., (2004), the optimal contract must 
maximize the value of the firm subject to two constraints, which are the enforcement 
constraint for the agent and the participation constraint for the principal. The 
first constraint shows that the agent (the firm) may accept to enforce the contract 
when the expected profit generated exceeds the default value. This default value 
is an endogenous function, depending on the capital invested, and the industrial 
shocks affecting the profit of the firm. The second constraint implies that the 
expected profit share for the principal (the financier) must be greater or equal 
to the set-up investment. Otherwise, the contract will not be executed. Based on 
the financial contracting enforceability approach proposed by Cooley et al., (2004) 
among others, we are able to determine the contract that maximizes the value of 
the firm and aligns agent’s interest in case of imperfect market. By comparing to 
the previous studies in Islamic and conventional finance, this approach allows us 
to determine the optimality of equity and debt financings based on the interests of 
the principal and the agent. In addition, it enables us to assess the level of market 
frictions that the principal and the agent may bear, if they want to maximize their 
profit. In sum, this method allows us to deal with contractual arrangements from 
a new angle with the aim to come out with relevant insights regarding conflicts 
interest mitigation in imperfect market.
3.2. General form of the maximization program
Consider X the payments received by the entrepreneur at time t, the maximization 
program based on Cooley et al (2004) is the following:
 (1)
Subject to
 (2)
  
 (3)
 (4)
 (5)
t
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Equation (1) defines the value of the firm, which depends on the profit 
generated by the firm “Xt” the maturity of the contract T, which is equal to 5 
years, the total fund invested “Ft”, the labor parameter lt and the discount rate 
factor. Furthermore, the variable Z = [ZL, ZH] presents the industrial shocks which 
could be low or high. According to Tauchen (1986), these shocks follow a first 
order Markov process because the value of the shock in the future depends on the 
previous or actual value. As mentioned by Adda and Cooper (2002) the probability 
of fulfilling ZH depends on the current value of the shock which is ZL.
Equation (2) is the enforcement constraint, where the first component defines 
the profit received by the agent (the entrepreneur) and the second component 
refers to the default value or the repudiation value. According to Cooley et al 
(2004) the value of continuing the contract for the firm after realization of the 
shock cannot be smaller than the value of repudiation. More precisely, the authors 
indicated that the firm shall continue the project only if the enforcement value is 
greater than the default value. As pointed out by the same authors, the default 
value has been defined in equation (3), where  are κ respectively, the value of 
searching a new project and the cost of repudiation. Similarly, Cooley et al (2004) 
claimed that the value of searching a new project is endogenous and depends 
on all the equilibrium conditions. In addition, they imply that the variable p in 
the equation (4) refers to the probability of finding the high productivity project, 
which depends on the availability of the projects and on the number of searching 
entrepreneurs. Therefore, they assume that  where M refers to the 
available projects and S defines the number of searching entrepreneurs. Cooley 
et al (2004) measured this probability according to how the economy responds 
to the arrival of a new technology that increases the number of high-productivity 
projects M.
Cooley et al (2004) considered two assumptions about the persistence of the 
shock, which are temporary and permanent. However, we should mention that in 
our study the persistence of the industrial shock cannot be permanent because the 
economy has always been changing. Concerning the situation of temporary shocks, 
they consider the case in which Mt is independently and identically distributed 
as uniform in the interval [0,n] where n is the mass of newborn entrepreneurs. 
Thus, the expected value of Mt is defined by . Although in equilibrium only 
new-born entrepreneurs search for a high-productivity project, Cooley et al (2004) 
claim that St = n, and the probability of success  is uniformly distributed 
in the interval [0,1]. In the same way, Cooley et al (2004) showed that after a long 
sequence of , the arrival of a new technology increases . 
Hence, this implies that after a long sequence of pt = 0,5, this probability increases 
to one then it reverts to its mean value after the next period. Although  , 
 and St = n in equilibrium, the expression of the probability of finding the 
high productivity project will be defined as given: . More precisely it 
will be equal to . Equation (5) is the participation constraint for the 
principal (the financier), where, Yt is the profit given to the financier and I0 is the 
setup investment. This constraint imposes that the discounted value of payments 
received by the principal should be equal or greater than the setup investment. 
Otherwise, the financier may repudiate the contract.
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3.3. Profit and Cost equations
This sub-section aims at determining the profit and cost equations for the agent 
when murabahah and ijarah financing are used. For what follows, Cooley et al (2004) 
assumed that it is convenient to define the discounted expected profit generated 
by the firm before determining the profits equations related to both contracts. 
Accordingly, the profit equation form is provided as follows:
         (6)
The production function can take two different values:
 in case of low shock (7)
 in case of high shock (8)
where the parameter 0 < b < 1 is the probability of liquidation that stems from the 
event of losing the project due to the agent’s death or any other unexpected events, 
(Cooley et al., 2004). The function ft depends on the industrial shock Z = (ZL , ZH) 
and the invested funds. The parameter 0 < α < 1 measures market frictions. The 
parameter 0 < δ < 1 is a random variable defining the depreciation rate. Finally, the 
parameters ωt and lt represent the wage and the labor respectively.
The profit function of Cooley et al. (2004) takes account of several variables 
that may affect the production function and the survival of the firm in imperfect 
markets. They considered that the industrial shocks, the probability of 
liquidation, the wage and labor are fundamental to assess the profit generated 
by the firm. If the firm is liquidated, which happens when b reaches the unity, 
the firm’s value is equal to . Nevertheless, if the firm does not face any 
risk of liquidation, i.e., b = 0, the production takes place and the firm’s value is 
. The disutility from working is defined 
by Cooley et al. (2004) as:
where B is a factor that captures the amount of time spent on working and ϵ 
corresponds to the elasticity of labor. With the properties of the disutility function 
can be given by the following partial derivatives with respect to labor: ϱ (0) > 0; 
ϱ’ (lt) > 0; and ϱ” (lt) > 0. Cooley et al. (2004) claim that the wage factor is the 
first derivative of the disutility from working ωt= ϱ’ (lt), implying that ϱ’ (lt) = ωt = 
B .
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3.3.1. Profit and Cost Functions for Murabahah
Murabahah contract is defined as a sale transaction used in trade and asset. 
Generally, the bank purchases the materials and delivers them to the client. 
Thus, the delivering price is usually increased by a pre-determined rate, which 
represents the profit of the principal. This rate is mostly negotiable between agents 
before concluding the contract. Furthermore, the payment is deferred to a date 
agreed by the two parties. In case of default, however, the agent loses the control 
of the asset. Consider the parameter  as the increased pre-determined rate fixed 
by the principal, the fund raised by the firm in this case will be equal to Ft
e (1 + ), 
where  denotes the profit margin for the principal and Fte = Ft defines the external 
fund. Thereby, the profit function of the firm is presented as given:
  (9)
Where:
 in case of low shock (10)
 in case of high shock (11)
In the same way, the cost of this contract, which represent the profit received by 
the principal is defined as given:
  (12)
Where,  defines the remuneration of the principal and Fte is the total funds 
invested. In case of default, the firm will not be able to repay the loan, which 
obliges the agent to repudiate the contract and loses the control of the asset.
3.3.2. Profit and Cost Equations for Ijarah
According to the literature, ijarah is a contract of sale of right for a period of time, 
and it takes a hire-purchase form. For example, sometimes there is a promise 
by the lessor to sell the asset to the lessee (the agent) at the end of the contract, 
or simply return it to the owner. Thereby, the firm may face two different types 
of ijarah, namely the operating lease and financial lease, which is also known as 
Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek (IMB). In case of operating lease, the ownership of the 
leased assets remains with the bank at the end of the lease period. Nevertheless, 
Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek (IMB) or financial lease is defined as a form of transfer of 
ownership of assets for a particular period based on a defined rent.
According to shari’ah Authority Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC), this 
rent is usually higher than the normal rental to encourage the lessor to transfer the 
leased assets to the lessee at the end of the lease period after the settlement of all 
installments immediately. In this study thereby, we consider the second form of 
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ijarah, while it is considered the most known is Islamic finance as stated by Shari’ah 
Authority Council of Bank Negara Malaysia (SAC). While ijarah is relatively linked 
to lease contract, we consider ϕ the pre-determined rate increasing funds invested. 
The parameter ϕ defines the profit margin received by the principal in case of 
financial lease. Consequently, the profit and the cost equations of the firm are 
defined below:
  (13)
Where,
 in case of low shock (14)
 in case of high shock (15)
Similarly, the cost equation of the firm in case of ijarah contract is defined below:
 (16)
This equation defines the profit received by the principal. Nevertheless, in case 
of default or damage to the leased asset that comes from lessee negligence, the 
agent may lose control of the asset.
3.4. Determination of the Industrial Shock
Based on Adda and Cooper (2002); Tauchen (1986), the two levels of shocks are 
determined by the following first-order autoregressive process, AR (1)
 (17)
Where εt + 1 is defined as the white noise and is distributed with mean zero and 
unit variance σε2. The parameter ρ is the slope coefficient of the AR (1) process, 
which represents the persistence of the shock. According to Adda and Cooper 
(2002) and Stokey and Lucas (1989), the quality of the approximation remains 
good except when the parameter ρ is very close to the unity. Even though, Tauchen 
(1986) indicated that the parameter ρ must be less than 0.9 for highly persistence 
of the shock. Experimentations showed that when it is close to 0.9, the gap 
between consecutive shocks becomes very low. To discretize the AR (1) process, 
Tauchen (1986) assumed that the process stays within a bounded interval to be 
able to solve the problem. Specifically, the author considered that the shock can 
be approximated by a two-state Markov chain such that Z can take on two values 
namely, ZL,ZH (ZL < ZH). Adda and Cooper (2002) assumed that the probability 
of the realization of the shocks can be determined by the following symmetric 
transition matrix:
t
t
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The variables ZL,ZH and q are selected by Adda and Cooper (2002) such that the 
process reproduces the conditional first and second order moments of the AR (1) 
process as follows:
First-order moment:
Second-order moment:
From the two equations of the first-order moment, we get ZL = -ZH, and  
Inserting these two results into the two equations of the second-order moment 
generates the following:
 (18)
 (19)
However, one practice concern for the above approach is how to deal with 
negative values of the shock. More precisely, this means that the technology 
of the firm produces negative output, which does not hold from an economic 
perspective. To avoid this situation, it is required to transform the shock by taking 
its exponential form in order to ensure that all values of the shock are positive.
3.5. Assumptions
 Assumption 1: the contract is optimal when it maximizes the value of the 
firm subject to the enforcement constraint for the agent and the participation 
constraint for the principal (Cooley et al., 2004)
 Assumption 2: The principal can observe the information related to the firm 
only in case of bankruptcy. While it has always been a difference between 
declared and non-declared profit, the moral hazard problem occurs. Thus, 
problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard still exist and cannot 
be ignored, (Cooley et al., 2004).
 Assumption 3: There is only one principal and one entrepreneur. Hart 
(1995) considered only one principal and one agent for contract arrangement 
because, in case of multiple agents and principles, it will be difficult to satisfy 
the incentives of compatible contracts and the optimality of the transaction.
 Assumption 4: The principal and the agent are rational. The literature implies 
that economic agents are rational because they continuously aim to maximize 
their profit and minimize agency costs.
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3.6. Model Determination based on Contracts
3.6.1. Murabahah Contract
Although murabahah is a sale transaction contract, the bank purchases the 
assets in order to deliver it to the customer in exchange of pre-determined price. 
This price is increased by a pre-determined rate representing the profit of the 
financier. Nevertheless, when bankruptcy occurs, the agent loses the asset and 
the control shifts to the principal. Following the study of Cooley et al., (2004), the 
maximization program for the principal and the agent is defined as follows:
 (20)
Subject to
 (21)
 (22)
 (23)
 (24)
Where equations (20), (21), and 24) define the value function of the firm, the 
enforcement constraint for the agent and the participation constraint for the 
principal respectively, when murabahah financing is used. In addition, equation 
(22) represents the default value for the agent whereas equation (22) refers to the 
value of searching a new project in case of murabahah contract.
3.6.2. Ijarah Contract
Considering the simplest form of ijarah as a contract of sale of the right to use 
an asset for a given period of time in exchange of a pre-determined rate, the 
maximization program for the principal and the agent are defined as given.
  (25)
Subject to
 (26)
 (27)
 (28)
 
 (29)
Equation (25) defines the value of the firm, whereas equations (26) and (29) 
refer to the enforcement constraint for the agent and the participation constraint 
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for the principal. Furthermore, equations (27) and (28) represent the default value 
for the entrepreneur and the value of searching a new project when ijarah financing 
is used.
IV. PARAMETERS CALIBRATION
Tables 1 and 2 show the calibration of the state and control variables. Whilst a 
control variable corresponds to a variable that can be parameterized, a state 
variable is random and cannot be controlled.
Table 1.
Calibration of Control Variables
Parameter Label Value References
δ Depreciation rate 0.0579 (Cooley et al., 2004)
rf Risk-free rate 0.0400 (Cooley et al., 2004; Ahmed, 2002) 
b Probability of liquidation
0.0500 (Cooley et al., 2004)
l Labor factor 0.3300 (Cooley et al., 2004; Evans, 1987; 
Atkeson and Kehoe, 2007)
κ
Cost of 
repudiation
0.35 (Cooley et al., 2004)
B Disutility from 
working
0.001 (Cooley et al., 2004)
ϵ
The elasticity of 
labor
1.000 (Cooley et al., 2004)
F = Fe Invested funds 100 Adda and Copper (2002)
Table 1 shows all control variables used in our study. The same risk-free 
interest rate, rf was considered since the Islamic Inter-bank Rate (IIBR) and 
London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) are significantly dependent, (Ben Amar, 
2018). Although “Islamic banks pricing practices are likely to converge towards 
conventional ones” Ben Amar (2018, p. 7), the risk-free interest value calibrated 
by Cooley et al. (2004) is considered in this study for murabahah and ijarah. The 
probability of liquidation is set to b = 0.05. Following the study of Cooley et al. 
(2004) this is consistent with the numbers reported in industry dynamics studies 
such as Evans (1987). The elasticity of labor is set to ϵ = 1, which is the value often 
used in business cycle studies, (Cooley et al., 2004). The parameter B is chosen by 
the authors, so that one third of available time is spent on working. The repudiation 
factor κ is set 0.35 (Cooley et al. (2004), implying that the repudiation cost is 35 
percent of the value of variable capital used by the firm.
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Table 2.
Calibration of State Variables
Variable Label Value References
j
Profit margin of the principal
in case of Ijarah
[0.25;0.6] Shari’ah Advisory Council
(SAC Bank Negara Malaysia)
Profit margin of the principal
in case of murabahah
[0.2;0.4] Shari’ah Advisory Council
(SAC Bank Negara Malaysia)
a Market frictions [0;1] Ahmed (2002)
Although this study examines debt-based contracts, it is recommended to 
provide theoretical evidence regarding the calibration of the state variables (Table 
2). Dealing with debt-based contract, murabahah is a shari’a compatible mode 
of debt financing, which involves the sale of a commodity for a deferred price 
including mark-up or profit margin. Technically, murabahah is the mark-up or the 
profit margin provided to the purchaser of a certain specified asset, excluding 
monetary assets such as cash and receivables. In practice the profit margin varies 
according to credit risk factors, customer type, goods/assets and term of financing. 
Consequently, the literature supports this variation, while murabahah contract is 
separately concluded for each customer.
Considered the highest Shariah authority for Islamic finance in Malaysia, 
the Shari’ah Advisory Council of Bank Negara (SAC) puts stress on the pricing 
problem in case of murabahah15 by providing several explanations and examples. 
Admitting that the pricing of murabahah financing may take into consideration the 
London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as the base rate, the profit margin of the 
bank varies between 10% and 12% for a specific commodity, such as cars when the 
financing period is less or equal to three years. However, in case of firm’s financing 
the profit margin may range between 20% and 40%, and sometimes it exceeds 40% 
depending on the risk factor and the activity of the firm (SAC). Hypothetically, we 
consider that the profit margin for murabahah financing is ranged between [20%; 
40%] which are the minimum and the maximum profit margin that the principal 
may receive.
As far as the second form of Islamic debt-based contracts is concerned, the 
literature defines ijarah as the rent or the lease of a given asset. In practice, this 
contract comprises several principal features such as services, assets, ownership 
and usage rights and liabilities, lease period and rental amount. In its technical 
sense, (SAC)16 indicated that the term ijarah has two different meanings. First, it 
can be defined as a hire contract to employ the services of a person with a pre- 
determined wages service. Second, it can be considered as lease contract to 
transfer the usufruct of a particular property to another person in exchange for a 
rent. The most know form of ijarah is ijarah Muntahia bi al-Tamlik, defined as a lease 
15. See Sharia’h Advisory Council, (2009). Draft of Sharia’h Parameter, Reference 1, Murabahah, for the 
approximation of the principal’s profit margin in case of murabahah financing.
16. See Sharia’h Advisory Council, (2009). Draft of Sharia’h Parameter, Reference 2, Ijarah, for the 
approximation of the principal’s profit margin in case of ijarah financing
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contract, which ends with the transfer of the leased asset to the lessee. However, 
the challenge was the establishment of a standard industry margin in order to 
specify the profit margin for the bank, and rental amount. Admitting that the 
profit margin in this context depends on the firm’s activity sector, the risk factor, 
the maturity of the contract and the type of the asset, IFIs adopted London Inter- 
bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) or base Lending Rate (BLR) as a basis rate to calculate 
the profit margin and the rental amount by including the risk factor.
Assuming the risk factor is the most determinant component for bankers in 
this context, several illustrations are highlighted (SAC) in order to approximate 
the profit margin according to the activity of the firm. While the profit margin 
has almost been ranged between 40% and 50% according to (SAC), it was noticed 
that the manufacturing sector provides a margin average between [40%; 60%]. 
For retailers, bankers consider a margin between [25%; 50%], whereas the most 
used margin is 40%. Dealing with distributors, IFIs adopted a margin around 
[25%; 50%], whereas they generally used 30% in this case. Based on the forgoing 
evidence it is noticeable that the profit margin varies proportionally according to 
the main activity of the firm, whereas the average adopted by IFIs in Malaysia 
ranges between 40% and 50% as stated above. Therefore, it is recommended in this 
theoretical study to consider the minimum and the maximum margin because we 
are dealing with a general context that does not consider the main activity of the 
firm. Hence, the profit margin for the principal in case of ijarah financing is equal 
to ϕ = [25%; 60%].
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
This section aims to determine the optimal financing contract that maximizes 
the value of the firm subject to the enforcement constraint for the agent and 
the participation constraint for the principal regarding the variation of market 
frictions and the two levels of shocks. To do so, the simulation process linked to 
the maximization program is defined as follows.
• Firstly, it is required to calculate the two levels of shocks using the equations 
(17), (18), and (19), based on the study of Adda and Cooper (2002), Tauchen 
(1986), and Stokey and Lucas (1989).
• Secondly, we write the script of the objective function (equation (1)) after 
calculating the profit generated by the firm using the equations (6), (7) and (8).
• Thirdly, we build the code of both constraints using the equations (2), (3), (4) 
and (5) in a separate file.
• Fourthly, we use the optimization toolbox in Matlab to generate our results, 
by identifying the objective function, the constraints and the lower and upper 
bounds of the state variables.
• The optimization problem generates three plots, namely the current point, which 
indicates the simulated state variables, the current function demonstrating 
the optimal value of the firm, and the first-order optimality representing the 
value of firm’s constraints violation) for each contract. We have to mention 
that Matlab’s output generates negative values for the second and third plots. 
However, we interpret such simulated values as positive numbers (Table 3).
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Figure 2.
Murabahah (High Shock)
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Figures 1 and 2 display the optimal values related to murabahah contract when 
the shock is low and high, after considering market frictions. The bar graphs of 
Figures 1 and 2 show the optimal values of the state variables namely, market 
frictions and the principal’s profit margin. We notice that the simulated values of 
the parameters α and the profit margin (g,φ) have been changed for both contracts 
when moving from the low shock to the high shock. The market frictions’ parameter 
is optimally equally to 0.2 in case of low shock and 0.55 in case of high shock, 
respectively. Such a result indicates that when moving from the low shock to the 
high shock, market frictions tend to increase, implying that conflicts of interest 
among the principal and the agent may occur, which is in line with (Ebrahim and 
Sheikh, 2016).
Dealing with murabahah financing in case of low shock, the profit margin g, 
generated is equal to 0.2, which is the optimal margin received by the principal. 
Furthermore, the optimal values of the firm subject to the enforcement constraint 
for the agent and the participation constraint for the principal are equal to 32.3581 
and 78.8896 for the low and high shocks, respectively. As for the first-order 
optimality, the corresponding optimal values are equal to 4.8229 and 2.7156 for the 
low and high shocks, respectively. These simulation results indicate that when the 
shock is low the optimal profit margin allows the principal to handle the increase 
of market frictions, enabling her to get a firm’s optimal value around 32.3581. In 
case of high shock, the simulated value of the state variable g has experienced a 
significant change due to the increase of market frictions’ parameter. Consequently, 
the optimal value of the firm increases to 78.8896, whereas the constraint violation 
becomes equal to 2.7156.
For a given level of market frictions at α = 0.55, the increase of the optimal 
value from 32.3581 (in case of low shock) to 78.8896 (in case of high shock) means 
that the firm is able to maximize its value and aligns agents’ interests. Admitting 
that moving from the low shock to the high shock engenders an increase of 
market frictions’ parameter, the principal is compensated for this critical situation 
by having a higher profit margin rate. In case of high shock, the level of market 
frictions increases to reach 0.55, implying that agents are more likely to cheat in 
order to satisfy her interest. However, the increase of the profit margin to 0.25 
allows the principal to handle this level of information asymmetry.
Accordingly, the principal and the agent observe that their maximized value 
function increasing as a consequence of a higher level of the shock. It is for this 
reason that the simulated parameters regarding the market frictions and the profit 
margin have been changed after moving from the low shock to the high shock. In 
the same context, it is noticed that the increase of the shock alters the behavior of 
agents, which is mostly attributed to moral hazard. Consequently, the principal’s 
profit margin slightly increases as a response of the higher risk taken in case of 
high shock. It is more attractive to enforce murabahah contract in the case of high 
shock because the optimal value of the firm is higher.
Similar findings are determined when ijarah financing is used. Table 3, Figure 
3, and Figure 4 display that the market frictions and the profit margin’s simulated 
parameters are optimally equal to 0.2 and 0.25, in the case of low shock, and for 
0.55 and 0.3, in the case of high shock, respectively. The simulated market frictions’ 
parameters correspond to the same values in the case of murabahah, which is mostly 
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Table 3.
Simulation Results
Murabahah Ijarah
ZL ZH ZL ZH
Market frictions’ parameter: 0.2000 0.5500 0.2000 0.5500
Principal’s profit-margins: 0.2000 0.2500 0.2500 0.3000
Current optimal function value: 32.3581 78.8896 33.7104 81.6103
Constraints violation 4.8229 2.7156 0.2697 2.7156
attributed to the common debt-based agreements to both contracts. Nevertheless, 
the simulated value of the profit margin rates for the principal has been changed 
from 0.25 in the case of low shock to 0.3, in the case of high shock. Compared to 
murabahah, the principal requests a higher profit margin in both cases of the shock 
when ijarah financing is used, whereas the variation of market frictions remains 
same for both contracts. This is attributed to the fact that the principal judges 
relevant to increase his profit margin in case of ijarah because murabahah is a simple 
contract of sale.
Regarding the optimized value of the firm, it is clear that it increases in the case 
of high shock as a response to the increased level of market frictions. Indeed, we 
notice that the optimal function value increased from 33.7104 to 81.6103 for ijarah 
in the cases of low and high shocks, respectively. The comparison between both 
contracts on the basis of the optimal value of the firm shows that the ijarah contract 
has the highest simulated value in both cases of low and high shocks, whereas 
the gap between this contract and the murabahah financing is very tight. This is 
indicative that the ijarah contract slightly dominates the murabahah contracts from 
the point of view of the principal and the agent who aim to maximize the value of 
the firm and align their interests. Therefore, we should claim that for a higher value 
of market frictions’ parameter, the principal considers that it is more attractive to 
be engaged in a ijarah contract because (i) the optimized value of the firm is the 
highest between both contracts and (ii) her profit-margin ratio is higher to get 
compensated for the increased market frictions’ value.
The examination of the simulated values that correspond to the first-order 
optimality indicates that, for the murabahah contract, it tends to decrease from a 
higher value (in case of a low shock) to a lower value (in case of high shock). 
However, for the ijarah, the first-order optimality value increases from a lower level 
(in case of low shock) to the higher level (in case of high shock). This is explained 
in terms of the enforcement and the participations’ constraints corresponding to 
the maximization program. In addition, it is noticeable that the simulated values 
of the state variables have been changed for both contracts, depending on the two 
levels of shocks. This change can be explained by the selfish behavior of the agent 
who is more likely to cheat and hide a significant information about the project in 
order to maximize her profit when economic conditions do not improve.
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Figure 4.
Ijarah (High Shock)
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Financing decision plays a crucial role for small firms and start-ups, especially 
when it comes to market frictions and the difficulties that they may face to get 
external funds and improve their business. Several financing instruments might 
be provided for agents whereas the selection of the optimal contract remains 
hard to achieve. This paper examines Islamic debt-based contract in order to 
yield further evidence regarding the excessive use of murabahah in Islamic finance 
instead of ijarah. Although this paper aims to determine the optimal contract that 
maximizes the value of the firm subject to the interests of the principal and the 
agent, the simulation results came out with relevant evidence. Findings reveal 
several insights regarding murabahah and ijarah contracts, based on the market 
frictions’ parameter, the two levels of shocks and the optimal values generated for 
each contract.
Indeed, it was noticeable that the principal and the agent may bear the 
same level of market frictions when the shock is low and high. Admitting that 
the possibility of cheating is less likely to occur in case of low shock, our results 
show that the agent becomes more likely to hide significant information about 
the project when the shock is high for both contracts. Consequently, the profit 
margin’s values for the principal increased when moving from the low shock to 
the high shock in order to compensate the considered higher risk. Consequently, 
the optimal values of the firm for both contracts increased in case of high shock, 
implying that the principal and the agent are able to maximize the value of the 
firm and align their interests in imperfect market.
In the same context, the simulation results show that the simulated optimal 
values for murabahah and ijarah are 32.3581 and 33.7104 in the case of low shock, 
and 78.8896 and 81.6103 in the case of high shock, respectively. This finding implies 
that ijarah allows the principal and the agent to get a higher value of the firm and 
mitigate conflicts of interest when the shock is low and high. In nutshell, ijarah 
contract slightly dominates murabahah contract when the shock is low and high. 
Although IFSB announced that murabahah is the most used contract in Islamic 
financing, this paper proves that the excessive use of this contract is not reasonable 
from the financial perspective for two main facts, unless it is supported by political 
and governmental authorities. First, ijarah dominates murabahah when the shock 
is low and high. Second, the gap between the optimal values of the firm in case of 
murabahah and ijarah for both levels of shocks is not significant.
Based on the simulation results, it is shown that the adoption of murabahah is 
related to regulations, rather than financial issues. Compared to the simplicity of 
murabahah, the legal issues addressed with respect to ijarah, such as the ownership 
of the asset constitute the main obstacle to promote this lease contract. Although 
ijarah suits certain projects, its role remains important within the economy in order 
to fulfill the needs of economic agents who are looking for financing. Our findings 
may motivate policy makers and regulators to re-think about ijarah financing. More 
precisely it may encourage economic players, scholars and monetary authorities 
to shed some light on the legal issues encountering ijarah in order to provide 
alternative solutions.
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Our paper has three main limits. First, our results were not compared to real- 
data because the latter are not available. Second, our paper is a general framework 
to determine the optimal contract that maximizes the value of the firm subject 
to agents’ interest, but does not consider the firm and sectorial characteristics. 
Third, this study does not take account of the legal issues that the principal and 
the agent may face when ijarah and murabahah financings are used. However, it can 
be extended in various ways where, a qualitative analysis can be adopted to put 
stress on the principal-agent behavior in financial contracting. An adverse selection 
analysis can also be considered in order to determine the less risky contract for 
the principal when ijarah and murabahah financings are used. In addition, the 
examination of firm dynamics in the case of equity and debt financing can provide 
further arguments for economic agents regarding the value of the firm, the growth 
rate and the lifetime of the project when information is asymmetrically distributed.
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